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Abstract
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program
(DACA) required individuals to provide a great deal of personal
information in order to participate and remain in the United
States legally; could information in the same system now be
used for deportations? More broadly, how should systems of
data that are created legitimately by United States agencies
and compiled for one reason, be used for other reasons? The
increasing emphasis on “smart cities” that use data to
efficiently provide and plan for service delivery will require the
integration of data from multiple government and nongovernment sources, in ways that citizens may not expect.
There are increasing calls for the federal government to open
up and share the data collected for one reason for use in
additional, unrelated ways, and to combine that data with data
collected by commercial, private entities. Systems design for
enabling citizen privacy is essential for a foundation of trust
between public agencies and citizens. For example, the Census
Bureau is beginning to take additional steps to protect the
facially anonymous statistics that it releases, due to concerns
that individuals may be identified by increasingly sophisticated
technical means that link data to persons. To address privacy
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in fast growing and evolving government information systems,
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
proposes a systems approach to protect the privacy of
personally identifiable information held by federal agencies. It
adopts a privacy engineering and risk management approach
with three privacy engineering objectives: predictability,
manageability, and disassociability. Because of its fundamental
importance to the effective protection of privacy, this article
focuses on the first privacy engineering objective:
predictability. Predictability is not an established term in the
privacy literature. Therefore, this article analyzes the concept
of predictability, what it may mean and how it may evolve, and
then analyzes it by means of established legal concepts.
Nonobviousness in patent law and the reasonable expectation
standard in privacy jurisprudence provide lessons for the
creation and maintenance of more trustworthy systems and the
protection of citizen privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program
(DACA) required individuals to provide a great deal of personal
information in order to participate and remain in the United
States legally; could information in the same system now be
used for deportations?1 More broadly, how should systems of
data that are created legitimately by United States agencies
and compiled for one reason, be used for other reasons? Data
collected by local governments in order to provide services, such
as water and sewer, might be useful for predicting family
growth and school populations, for example. The increasing
emphasis on “smart cities” that use data to efficiently provide
and plan for service delivery will require the integration of data
from multiple government and non-government sources, in
ways that citizens may not expect.2 Furthermore, there are
increasing calls for the federal government to open up data
collected for one reason for use in additional, unrelated ways,
and to combine that data with data collected by commercial,
private entities.3 Though well-defined data can beneficially
inform decision making, without updated, intentional,
integrated protections, citizens’ privacy may be the victim.
Certainly, data breaches are a concern, but those are not the
only threats to privacy as “there is increasing use of
government statistical data by private organizations that seek
to link data collected for statistical purposes with identifiable
individuals.”4 Indeed, the Census Bureau is beginning to take
additional steps to protect the facially anonymous statistics
that it releases, due to concerns that individuals may be
1. See Caitlin Dickson, ‘DREAMers’ Gave Up Their Personal Info for
DACA. They Wonder, Will the U.S. Use It to Deport Them? YAHOO NEWS (Sept.
7, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/dreamers-gave-personal-data-daca-nowwonder-will-u-s-use-deport-204512167.html.
2. See Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon:
Protecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581
(2014); Janine S. Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the
Resilience of Privacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309 (2017).
3. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING AND MEDICINE,
INNOVATIONS IN FEDERAL STATISTICS: COMBINING DATA SOURCES WHILE
PROTECTING PRIVACY 11 [hereinafter INNOVATIONS IN FEDERAL STATISTICS]
(Robert M. Groves and Brian A. Harris-Kojetin, Eds., 2017) (making it clear,
however, that statistical uses should not identify individuals and that privacy
protections are essential); COMMISSION ON EVIDENCE BASED POLICY MAKING,
THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCE BASED POLICY-MAKING (2017).
4. See INNOVATIONS IN FEDERAL STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 74.
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identified by increasingly sophisticated technical means that
link data to persons.5
To address privacy in fast growing and evolving
government information systems, the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) proposes a systems approach
to protect the privacy of personally identifiable information
held by federal agencies (the “Privacy Framework”). It adopts a
privacy engineering and risk management approach,
introducing two important components: privacy engineering
objectives and a privacy risk model. The three privacy
engineering objectives proposed in the Privacy Framework are
predictability, manageability, and disassociability.
Because of its fundamental importance to the effective
protection of privacy, this article focuses on the first privacy
engineering objective: predictability. Systems design for
enabling citizen privacy is based on a foundation of trust
between public agencies and citizens, and NIST identified
predictability as one of the building blocks. But when is a
system predictable? And who decides when it meets that
objective? Predictability is not an established term in the
privacy literature. Therefore, this article analyzes the concept
of predictability, what it may mean and how it may evolve, and
then analyzes it by means of established legal concepts.
Administrators who apply a predictability objective to systems
of information can learn from lessons found in patent law and
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and as a result create more
trustworthy systems.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the
fundamental background of privacy principles and their
relationship to federal policies about data systems. Part II
describes the development of and relationship between the
Cybersecurity Framework and the Privacy Framework. Part III
focuses on understanding the building block of predictability,
examining its meaning and comparing it to analogous concepts
that are found in patent law nonobviousness and reasonable
expectation jurisprudence. In an era of increased pressure on
government agencies to make the information in their systems
widely available, the Conclusion proposes that agencies should
consider whether the gap between old and potentially new uses
of data is too wide, whether there is hindsight bias in risk
5. Id. at 75.
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assessments, and if the very analysis that they perform is
diminishing the assumptions that there is some personal
information that should remain private.
I.

INFORMATION SYSTEM PRIVACY AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY

Fair Information Privacy Practices, in one form or another,
are foundational principles for privacy protection around the
globe, and rules and policies are primary sources for
management of information in the government. The NIST
Privacy Framework, privacy objectives, and government policy,
refer to and implement many of these practices.
A. FAIR INFORMATION PRIVACY PRACTICES
In 1973 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
produced a document, Records, Computer, and the Rights of
Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Automated Personal Data Systems, that would become the
basis for much of modern information privacy theory.6 The
report, which was initially called the Code of Fair Information
Practices, but has become more widely known as the Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), listed five principles:
•
•
•

•
•

There must be no personal data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.
There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent
information about him that was obtained for one purpose
from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and
must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.7

These five principles have been the basis for most
subsequent guidelines regarding informational privacy and
data protection. In 1980, the Organization of Economic
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS,
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 41–42 (1973).
7. Id.
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) produced another
influential and slightly expanded enumeration of these
principles in its Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (the “OECD Guidelines”).8
The basic principles are: Collection Limitation, Data Quality,
Purpose Specification, Use Limitation, Security Safeguards,
Openness, Individual Participation, and Accountability.9
8. Org. of Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], The OECD Privacy
Framework, at 3 (2013).
9. The OECD principles are, in full:
Collection Limitation Principle
7. There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such
data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
Data Quality Principle
8. Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to
be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be
accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.
Purpose Specification Principle
9. The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified
not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use
limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion
of change of purpose.
Use Limitation Principle
10. Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise
used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with
Paragraph 9 except:
a) with the consent of the data subject; or
b) by the authority of law.
Security Safeguards Principle
11. Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards
against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use,
modification or disclosure of data.
Openness Principle
12. There should be a general policy of openness about developments,
practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be
readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal
data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and
usual residence of the data controller.
Individual Participation Principle
13. Individuals should have the right:
a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of
whether or not the data controller has data relating to them;
b) to have communicated to them, data relating to them
i. within a reasonable time;
ii. at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
iii. in a reasonable manner; and
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The OECD Guidelines were a primary source for the
development of the European Data Directive of 199510 and the
newly enacted General Data Protection Regulation11 (which
became effective in May 2018). They are also largely the basis
for the current iteration of FIPPs adopted by many federal
agencies and incorporated into the Office of Management
Budget’s very important 2016 revision.
B. FEDERAL RULES AND POLICIES
The requirements of the Office of Management and
Budget’s updated Circular A-130 (A-130) “apply to the
information resources management activities of all agencies of
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.”12 Among the
most important basic principles stated in the document are:
Government agencies shall be open, transparent, and accountable to
the public.
Protecting an individual’s privacy is of utmost importance. The
Federal Government shall consider and protect an individual’s
privacy throughout the information life cycle.
While security and privacy are independent and separate disciplines,
they are closely related.
The design of information collections shall be consistent with the
intended use of the information, and the need for new information
shall be balanced against the burden imposed on the public, the cost
of the collection, and any privacy risks.13

iv. in a form that is readily intelligible to them;
c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and
(b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and
d) to challenge data relating to them and, if the challenge is
successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended.
Accountability Principle
14. A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures
which give effect to the principles stated above. Id. at 14–15.
10. Directive 95/46, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) (EC).
11. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2016:119:FULL&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/ENB6-HFWK].
12. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-130 (2016),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/a130revised.pdf.
13. Id. at 3–4.
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A-130 also sets a number of policy goals for agencies that
need to be “specific, verifiable, and measurable, so that
progress against these goals can be tracked.”14 Regarding
inventories of data, agencies shall
Maintain an inventory of the agency’s information systems that
create, collect, use, process, store, maintain, disseminate, disclose, or
dispose of PII to allow the agency to regularly review its PII and
ensure, to the extent reasonably practicable, that such PII is
accurate, relevant, timely, and complete; and to allow the agency to
reduce its PII to the minimum necessary for the proper performance
of authorized agency functions.15

With regard to governance, agencies must “[r]equire that
information security and privacy be fully integrated into the
system development process.”16 With regard to information
management and access, agencies must incorporate into their
planning, budgeting, governance, and other policies, that
“[f]ederal information is properly managed throughout its life
cycle,
including . . . creation,
use,
processing,
storage,
maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposition.”17
Agencies must also ensure that “[f]ederal information and
information systems are managed in a manner that identifies
and mitigates privacy and security risks.”18
An entire section of A-130 is devoted to Privacy and
Information Security. In the subsection pertaining to privacy,
agencies are directed to
Establish and maintain a comprehensive privacy program that
ensures compliance with applicable privacy requirements, develops
and evaluates privacy policy, and manages privacy risks;
Limit the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance,
dissemination, and disclosure of PII to that which is legally
authorized, relevant, and reasonably deemed necessary for the proper
performance of agency functions;
To the extent reasonably practicable, ensure that PII is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete, and reduce all PII to the minimum
necessary for the proper performance of authorized agency functions;

14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. A-130 provides that “‘[p]ersonally identifiable information’ means
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity,
either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or
linkable to a specific individual.” Id. at 33.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id.
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Take steps to eliminate unnecessary collection, maintenance, and use
of Social Security numbers, and explore alternatives to the use of
Social Security numbers as a personal identifier;
Conduct privacy impact assessments when developing, procuring, or
using IT; and
Maintain and post privacy policies on all agency websites, mobile
applications, and other digital services, in accordance with the EGovernment Act and OMB policy.19

With regard to Information Security, A-130 mandates that
agencies implement standards and guidelines contained in
NIST Interagency or Internal Reports (NISTIRs), including the
Cybersecurity Framework and Privacy Framework.20 Appendix
II to A-130 addresses an agency’s Responsibility for Managing
Personally Identifiable Information.21 It states that while
FIPPs are not OMB requirements, “they are principles that
should be applied by each agency according to the agency’s
particular mission and privacy program requirements.”22 OMB
finds that “FIPPS retain a consistent set of core principles that
are broadly relevant to agencies’ information management
practices.”23 The FIPPs as applicable to federal agencies are
Access and Amendment. Agencies should provide individuals with
appropriate access to PII and appropriate opportunity to correct or
amend PII.24
Accountability. Agencies should be accountable for complying with
these principles and applicable privacy requirements, and should
appropriately monitor, audit, and document compliance. Agencies
should also clearly define the roles and responsibilities with respect
to PII for all employees and contractors, and should provide

19. Id. at 16–17.
20. Id. at 18.
21. Id. at Appendix II-1. Personally identifiable information (PII) is
defined as “information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s
identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked
or linkable to a specific individual” and is necessarily very broad. Id. Appendix
II discusses that agencies have to be very careful in determining what
information is PII and that in some cases, information that was not PII can
become PII when combined with other information. An agency needs to
evaluate the “sensitivity of each individual data element that is PII, as well as
all of the data elements together” and consider that the “sensitivity level of the
PII will depend on the context.” Id. at Appendix II-2.
22. Id. at Appendix II-2.
23. Id.
24. Id. While “access and amendment” often appears as part of “individual
participation,” the OMB notes that it is including it as a stand-alone principle
in A-130 “to emphasize the importance of allowing individuals to access and
amend their information when appropriate.” Id. at Appendix II-2 n.116.
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appropriate training to all employees and contractors who have
access to PII.25
Authority. Agencies should only create, collect, use, process, store,
maintain, disseminate, or disclose PII if they have authority to do so,
and should identify this authority in the appropriate notice.26
Minimization. Agencies should only create, collect, use, process, store,
maintain, disseminate, or disclose PII that is directly relevant and
necessary to accomplish a legally authorized purpose, and should only
maintain PII for as long as is necessary to accomplish the purpose.27
Quality and Integrity. Agencies should create, collect, use, process,
store, maintain, disseminate, or disclose PII with such accuracy,
relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to
ensure fairness to the individual.28
Individual Participation. Agencies should involve the individual in
the process of using PII and, to the extent practicable, seek individual
consent for the creation, collection, use, processing, storage,
maintenance, dissemination, or disclosure of PII. Agencies should
also establish procedures to receive and address individuals’ privacyrelated complaints and inquiries.29
Purpose Specification and Use Limitation. Agencies should provide
notice of the specific purpose for which PII is collected and should
only use, process, store, maintain, disseminate, or disclose PII for a
purpose that is explained in the notice and is compatible with the
purpose for which the PII was collected, or that is otherwise legally
authorized.30
Security. Agencies should establish administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards to protect PII commensurate with the risk and
magnitude of the harm that would result from its unauthorized
access, use, modification, loss, destruction, dissemination, or
disclosure.31
Transparency. Agencies should be transparent about information
policies and practices with respect to PII, and should provide clear

25. Id. at Appendix II-3.
26. Id. at Appendix II-3. While “authority” often appears as part of
“purpose specification,” the OMB notes that it is including it as a stand-alone
principle in A-130 “to emphasize the importance of identifying a specific
authority for creating, collecting, using, processing, storing, maintaining,
disseminating, or disclosing PII.” Id. at Appendix II-2 n.117.
27. Id. at Appendix II-3. The OMB notes that “minimization” is referred
to as “collection limitation” in some versions of the FIPPs, such as in the
OECD Guidelines. Id. at Appendix II-3 n.118.
28. Id. at Appendix II-3.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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and accessible notice regarding creation, collection, use, processing,
storage, maintenance, dissemination, and disclosure of PII.32

As described in Part II, NIST relates the predictability
objective to the OMB circular, and to the FIPPs of authority,
accountability, use and purpose limitation, and transparency.33
II. THE NIST FRAMEWORKS
The Privacy Framework follows from a successful and
earlier cybersecurity risk framework (the “Cybersecurity
Framework”).34 The Cybersecurity Framework was required to
be implemented by federal entities, but it was subsequently
widely adopted by the private sector.35 Because the Privacy
Framework evolved from the Cybersecurity Framework and is
an integrative part, it is relevant to briefly discuss its history
and parallel to the Privacy Framework.
A. THE CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK
In 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13636,
“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”36 Among

32. Id. at Appendix II-2-3. The OMB notes that “transparency” is referred
to as “openness” in some versions of the FIPPs, such as in the OECD
Guidelines. Id. at Appendix II-3 n.119.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE LAUNCHES COLLABORATIVE PRIVACY
FRAMEWORK
EFFORT
(Sept.
4,
2018),
https://www.nist.gov/newsevents/news/2018/09/department-commerce-launches-collaborative-privacyframework-effort (stating that the success of the Cybersecurity Framework
has provided guidance in developing the Privacy Framework). See generally
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FRAMEWORK
FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1 (2014),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf
(“In
enacting this policy, the Executive Order calls for the development of a
voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework–a set of industry standards
and best practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks.”)
[hereinafter CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK].
35. See Armand J. Zottola, NIST in the Private Sector, DIG. RIGHTS
REVIEW (Venable LLP Wash. D.C.), March 22, 2017, at 1, available at
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2878150e-9c01-4c05-b6fd06dbac58b4f7 (describing how the reach and influence of the Cybersecurity
Framework has extended to the private sector).
36. See Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 78 Fed. Reg.
11739, 11739–40 (Feb. 12, 2013) (identifying privacy and civil liberties
protections as essential in Section 5, and specifically naming the Fair
Information Practices Principles as a fundamental building block).
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other action items, the executive order tasked NIST with
creating a Cybersecurity Framework that
[I]nclude[s] a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and
processes that align policy, business, and technological approaches to
address cyber risks. The Cybersecurity Framework shall incorporate
voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices to the
fullest extent possible. The Cybersecurity Framework shall be
consistent with voluntary international standards when such
international standards will advance the objectives of this order, and
shall meet the requirements of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology Act . . . 37

Furthermore, NIST was instructed to produce a framework
that would “[p]rovide a prioritized, flexible, repeatable,
performance-based, and cost-effective approach, including
information security measures and controls, to help owners and
operators of critical infrastructure identify, assess, and manage
cyber risk.”38 The Executive Order set the approach for creating
secure cyber systems by focusing on the creation of a common
language, employing a risk management approach, and
requiring engagement across sectors, including voices from
public and private entities.39 Over the next year, NIST held
public meetings and received comments from a wide variety of
interest groups and stakeholders across multiple domains.40
While it is beyond the scope of this article to review the
Cybersecurity Framework in detail, it is important to
understand how it addressed the issue of privacy, and
furthermore, how the framework has been widely accepted by
the
private
sector
cybersecurity
community.41
The
Cybersecurity Framework set the stage for work in the privacy
arena,42 and the wide acceptance of the cybersecurity approach
37. Id. at 11741.
38. Id.
39. See CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 1 (explaining how
the Executive Order was implemented through the Cybersecurity
Framework).
40. See Janine S. Hiller & Roberta S. Russell, Modalities for Cyber
Security and Privacy Resilience: The NIST Approach, 2015 PROC. OF THE
ISCRAM, May 24–27, at 2.
41. See Zottola, supra note 35, at 1 (explaining the adoption of the
Cybersecurity Framework in the private sector).
42. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 34, ¶ 3 (“We’ve
had great success with broad adoption of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework,
and we see this as providing complementary guidance for managing privacy
risk.”) (quotation omitted).

44

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 20

may help analogize how the NIST Privacy Framework might be
similarly adopted and implemented.
The Cybersecurity Framework built a common terminology
and described a process for identifying and protecting assets,
detecting threats and vulnerabilities, responding to attacks,
and recovering from breaches.43 It provided a methodology to
create an institutional profile, against which industry
benchmarking could be carried out to understand the relative
position of an organization and its cyber security strengths and
weaknesses.44 Throughout, the framework included specific
actions and references to specific best practices, international
norms, industry standards, and existing cyber security
processes.45
The
resulting
Cybersecurity
Framework
implemented a risk management approach, intended to be
flexible and adaptable to a wide variety of government and
private sector critical infrastructures.46 It is important to note
that in addition to the federal systems where the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework can be mandatory, a great number of
private sector players have also voluntarily adopted the
approach.47 While there were criticisms, the NIST
43. See CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 1, 7 (explaining
the basics of the framework as providing a common language, identifying and
prioritizing risk and managing cybersecurity across an entire organization )
44. See id. at 4–5 (“The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity
activities, desired outcomes, and applicable references that are common across
critical infrastructure sectors.” This Core is then used to create a “Framework
Profile” which can be used to benchmark and guide decision making).
45. See id. at 1 (“The Framework provides organization and structure to
today’s multiple approaches to cybersecurity by assembling standards,
guidelines, and practices that are working effectively in industry today.”).
46. See id. (“The Framework enables organizations – regardless of size,
degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication – to apply the
principles and best practices of risk management to improving the security
and resilience of critical infrastructure.”).
47. “A recent Gartner study reported that NIST’s Cybersecurity
Framework is already used by 30% of U.S. organizations. This number is
expected to rise to 50% by 2020. According to a March 2016 survey by
Dimensional Research, 70% of these organizations adopted the framework to
align themselves with cybersecurity best practices, 29% were required to do so
by business partners, and 28% adopted the framework because of federal
contract requirements.” Zottola, supra note 35, at 1. There are applications in
health, see Lee Kim, Building Holistic, Robust Security with the NIST
Cybersecurity
Framework,
HIMMS
BLOG
(Apr.
18,
2017),
http://www.himss.org/news/
building-holistic-robust-security-nistcybersecurity-framework (calling for the adoption of the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework by healthcare organizations), and critical infrastructure, see U.S.
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Cybersecurity Framework addressed cybersecurity in a
systematic way that promoted enterprise decision making to
assess capabilities, strengthen cyber security, and reduce
vulnerabilities.48 The NIST cybersecurity risk management
framework has been a successful core document and has been
used not only by public agencies but by private business as
well.49
Cybersecurity and privacy are clearly not identical
concerns, but NIST recognized their complex relationship by
stating that “[i]ntegrating privacy and cybersecurity can
benefit organizations by increasing customer confidence,
enabling more standardized sharing of information, and
simplifying operations across legal regimes.”50 Privacy
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM,
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK https://www.us-cert.gov/ccubedvp/cybersecurityframework (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (explaining critical infrastructure the
Cybersecurity
Framework
can
be
used
to
protect);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, WHY YOU SHOULD ADOPT THE NIST
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasingit-effectiveness/ publications/assets/adopt-the-nist.pdf (“Framework targets
organizations that own or operate critical infrastructure.”), and there is a
proposed bill built on the framework, see Press Release, Congressman Ralph
Abraham, Abraham Introduces the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Bill
(February
28,
2017),
https://abraham.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/abraham-introduces-nist-cybersecurity-framework-bill (“H.R. 1224
takes steps to prompt federal agencies to follow National Institute for
Standards and Technology’s (NIST) widely accepted cybersecurity protocols
and technical standards.”).
48. See CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 13 (“An
organization can use the Framework as a key part of its systematic process for
identifying, assessing, and managing cybersecurity risk.”).
49. See Zottola, supra note 35, at 1 (“[I]ts influence and standards are
widely seen in the private sector and in many private sector commercial
agreements.”).
50. CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 3. NIST recently
released a document combining, for the first time, controls for both security
and privacy; see also NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY SPECIAL
PUBLICATION
800-53,
REVISION
5
(2017),
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-53/sp800-53r5-draft.pdf. It states
that it “provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for federal
information systems and organizations.” Id. at ii. “NIST continues to work
with the privacy community to better integrate privacy and security controls,
and is particularly interested in how best to achieve such integration in this
publication.” Id. at vi. The “latest draft goes beyond both information security
and the federal government to address ways all kinds of organizations can
maintain security and privacy in their interconnected systems.” NAT’L INST.
OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST CRAFTS NEXT-
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protection was embedded in the Cybersecurity Framework in
the sense that privacy impacts were part of a “general set of
considerations” within the cybersecurity audit, privacy legal
compliance activities, and training.51 Privacy was more
specifically addressed, in part, within a parallel document
called the “Roadmap,” released at the same time as the
Cybersecurity Framework and meant to be a practical
implementation aid.52 The Roadmap to the Cybersecurity
Framework criticized the widely recognized FIPPs as being
inadequate from a systems and risk management viewpoint
because they lacked common definitions for privacy and privacy
harms, and contained no metrics for measuring success or
determining best practices.53 The Cybersecurity Framework
and Roadmap led NIST to work towards a parallel privacy
systems and risk approach to tackle privacy concerns.
B. THE PRIVACY FRAMEWORK
NIST began its work on creating a privacy framework
along the same lines as the Cybersecurity Framework by first
bringing stakeholders together. The first workshop in April
2014 produced a debate between privacy scholars and systems
developers around creating a common terminology with which
multiple sides could communicate:
A key objective of the workshop was to explore the proposition that
development of privacy framework components analogous to other
engineering fields would enable the creation of reusable, standardsbased tools and practices for developers. These tools and practices
would facilitate the design and maintenance of systems and
technologies with strong privacy postures.54

GENERATION SAFEGUARDS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE INTERNET OF
THINGS (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2017/08/nistcrafts-next-generation-safeguards-information-systems-and-internet.
51. CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 13.
52. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST
ROADMAP FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, (Feb.
12,
2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/roadmap-021214.pdf
[hereinafter
CYBERSECURITY
ROADMAP];
see
also
CYBERSECURITY
FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 11 (discussing the roadmap).
53. See CYBERSECURITY ROADMAP, supra note 52 at 8–9.
54. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
SUMMARY OF THE PRIVACY ENGINEERING WORKSHOP AT THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (Apr. 10, 2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/privacyworkshop-summary-052114.pdf.
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A NIST goal was to “enable the creation of new systems
that mitigate the risk of privacy harm and address privacy
risks in a measurable way within an organization’s overall risk
management process.”55
In anticipation of the second workshop, in September 2014,
NIST published a “NIST Privacy Engineering Objectives and
Risk Model Discussion Draft (the “Discussion Draft”).56 The
Discussion Draft noted that “[i]n the security field, risk
management models, along with technical standards and best
practices, are key components of improving security. Similarly,
the safety risk management field also has well-developed
models, technical standards and best practices. To date, the
privacy field has lagged behind in the development of
analogous components.”57 For the first time, in an attempt to
close that gap, NIST proposed a set of privacy engineering
objectives—predictability, manageability, and confidentiality.58
The Discussion Draft compared these three privacy objectives
to the three cybersecurity objectives of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of information.59 Like the three
cybersecurity
objectives
that
would
mitigate
cyber
vulnerabilities, the proposed privacy objectives were intended
to allow systems operators to mitigate privacy harms.60 NIST
stated that in developing the three privacy objectives, its staff
was guided by its review of “long-standing theories on the
concept of privacy such as controlling for surprises and
avoiding the ‘creepy’ factor, self-determination and individuals’
interest in controlling their information and freedom from
intrusion.”61
After the second workshop, in May 2015, NIST produced
the Draft “Privacy Risk Management for Federal Information
Systems” (Draft) that combined the elements of privacy

55. Id.
56. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST
PRIVACY ENGINEERING OBJECTIVES AND RISK MODEL DISCUSSION DRAFT
(Sept.
15,
2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/01/19/nist_privacy_eng
r_objectives_risk_model_discussion_draft.pdf [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
57. Id. at 1. An output of the first workshop was the Discussion Draft.
58. See id. at 2–3.
59. See id. (comparing cybersecurity and privacy objectives).
60. See id. at 3–4.
61. Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
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engineering and risk management.62 The Draft again
emphasized that “[f]ederal agencies need methods that yield
repeatable and measurable results if they are to be able to
implement privacy protections in information systems in a
consistent manner,” and noted that while “existing tools such
as the FIPPs and privacy impact assessments (PIAs) provide a
foundation for taking privacy into consideration, they have not
yet provided a method for federal agencies to measure privacy
impacts on a consistent and repeatable basis.”63 The Draft
discussed that in other areas, such as cybersecurity, “risk
management has played a key role in enabling agencies to
achieve their mission goals while minimizing adverse
outcomes.”64
The Draft included three privacy engineering objectives –
predictability, manageability, and disassociability—“for the
purpose of facilitating the development and operation of
privacy-preserving information systems.”65 The objectives were
designed “to enable system designers and engineers to build
information systems that implement an agency’s privacy goals
and support the management of privacy risk.”66 Like the three
cybersecurity objectives, these three objectives “provide[d] a
degree of precision and measurability, so that system designers
and engineers, working with policy teams, can use them to
bridge the gap between high-level principles and
implementation.”67 The Draft noted that federal “agencies have
been reliant on principles like the FIPPs that have provided a
combination
of
values,
governance
principles,
and
requirements, but lack the concrete conceptualizations”68 that
the three cybersecurity objectives provide. The FIPPS “do not
yield an approach for consistent communication of outcomebased aspects of a system that would enable engineers to

62. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST
INTERNAL REPORT 8062, DRAFT PRIVACY RISK MANAGEMENT FOR FEDERAL
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2015), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir8062/nistir_8062_draft.pdf.
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 21.
68. Id. at 17.
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assess their systems for appropriate capabilities and system
design options.”69
The Draft emphasized that protecting privacy included not
only preventing harms to privacy from unauthorized access,
but also the “problematic data actions” that occurred during
normal system behavior.70 It included an Appendix that listed
and defined problematic data actions such as appropriation,
distortion, induced disclosure, insecurity, surveillance,
unanticipated revelation, and unwarranted restriction.71
In January 2017, NIST published a revised version of the
risk management approach (Privacy Framework).72 The
Privacy Framework reiterates the vitality of a privacy
engineering and risk management approach, and discusses the
additional importance of managing privacy risk as required by
the Office of Management and Budget’s updated Circular A130.73 Under A-130, there is “a new emphasis on managing
privacy risk beyond solely compliance with privacy laws,
regulations and policies.”74
The revised draft describes the Privacy Framework and
privacy protection as a multidisciplinary task that is constantly
pushed
by
technology,
stating
that
“Technological
improvements can provide tremendous individual and societal
benefits, but they also can have adverse effects on privacy at
both the individual and societal levels. The ideal system would
optimize benefits to the individual and society while
minimizing the adverse effects.”75 Furthermore, “systems
engineering and risk management processes could be used to
integrate
multidisciplinary
approaches
that
can
be
incorporated into effective privacy solutions.”76

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 22.
See id. at 54 (Appendix E).
See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY ENGINEERING AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN FEDERAL
SYSTEMS (2017), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf
[hereinafter PRIVACY FRAMEWORK].
73. See id. at 3.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id.
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Fundamentally, the Privacy Framework begins from the
premise that security and privacy are often intertwined.77 It
discusses how beneficial uses of new technology can
inadvertently produce “an unintended consequence or
byproduct of the system,”78 and that while many privacy
problems79 arise from the unauthorized use of a system, other
problems can arise from the authorized processing of
information. Examples of problems from unauthorized access to
PII are fairly well-known. They include “embarrassment or
other emotional distress” from the disclosure of information,
“economic loss from identity theft, or physical or psychological
harm from ‘stalking.’”80 Examples of “[p]roblems from
authorized processing may be less visible” or understood.81
These include a discriminatory or stigmatizing effect on those
receiving public benefits just from the collection information,
frustration from knowledge of inaccurate information or the
inability to correct it, and the loss of trust in a system that
results in one’s avoidance of a product or service that might
otherwise be beneficial.82 Such concerns about privacy and loss
of trust in systems “could even contribute to systemic failures
in our democratic institutions, such as voting.”83 For these
reasons, it is “vital that engineers understand the issue and
have the conceptual tools to build systems that minimize
problems for individuals when processing their information.”84
While acknowledging that there is no widely accepted
definition of “privacy engineering,” the framework adopts a
definition as “a specialty discipline of systems engineering
77. See id. at 7–9.
78. Id. at 8.
79. The Privacy Framework adopts the term “privacy problem” to
encompass what may otherwise be called privacy harm, privacy violation,
privacy intrusion, or privacy invasion. See id. at 9–10. “This report uses
‘privacy problems’ with the goal of enabling system engineers and privacy
specialists to more dispassionately discuss the potential adverse consequences
arising from the manner in which the system is processing PII.” Id. at 9.
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See id. (detailing the discrimination, frustration, and loss of trust that
can result from authorized processing)
83. Id. at 9–10 (citing Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big
Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 861, 905–06 (2014) which discusses how large-scale
data analytics can create privacy concerns in the electoral process outside of
the ballot box).
84. Id. at 10.
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focused on achieving freedom from conditions that can create
problems for individuals with unacceptable consequences that
arise from the system as it processes PII.”85 The framework
discusses that while the FIPPs may have longstanding
foundational meaning to those familiar with privacy principles,
they provide little guidance for systems designers and
implementers because they “contribute little to the
development of a repeatable and measurable process that can
be understood and communicated inside and outside the
organization.”86 The FIPPs “are value statements rather than
recipes,”87 while in contrast a privacy engineering process is an
“outcome-based focus provid[ing] the frame of reference that
can facilitate translation of privacy principles into system
privacy requirements.”88 While privacy officers still need to
provide expertise in identifying problems, “system engineers,
by gaining an understanding of a clear privacy outcome, would
be better positioned to become collaborative partners in the
process of building more trustworthy systems.”89 The
framework concludes this section of the report by warning that,
like any system that contains an element of risk, there should
be “no expectation that all privacy risk can be eliminated from
a system when it is processing PII.”90
The report discusses one of the challenges that it had at
the very first workshop—”the communications gap between
policy and legal teams and the engineering and information
technology (IT) teams . . . .”91 Privacy engineering can help
provide an outcome-oriented approach to translating privacy
principles to privacy requirements.92 The framework asserts
that these objectives “are not intended to be new statements of
policy,” but rather, like the Cybersecurity Framework
objectives, part of the “core characteristics of the systems.”93
The
privacy
engineering
objectives—predictability,

85. Id. at 10–11.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting JULIE MCEWEN ET AL., MITRE CORP., MITRE RESPONSE
TO OSTP/NITRD ‘NATIONAL PRIVACY RESEARCH STRATEGY’ RFI 8 (2014))
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 16.
92. See Id.
93. Id.
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manageability and disassociability—”are intended . . . to
encourage the implementation of measurable controls for
managing privacy risk” and “to help bridge the gap between
high-level privacy principles and their implementation within
systems.”94
As early as the 2015 Draft, NIST stated that “[p]rivacy
engineering objectives can play an important role in bridging
the gap between an agency’s goals for privacy and their
manifestation in information systems.”95 The 2017 Privacy
Framework echoed this sentiment, and stated that the
objectives would “provide a degree of precision” leading to
“measurable goals for managing privacy risk.”96 By focusing on
outcomes, privacy principles can then be translated “into
system privacy requirements.”97 The vision is that by
understanding the necessary privacy system outcomes, system
engineers can be “collaborative partners”98 with privacy
officers.
III. PRIVACY ENGINEERING OBJECTIVES
Three goals for standard setting seems to be de rigueur;
the three cybersecurity objectives—confidentiality, integrity,
and availability—are widely known information systems goals,
and NIST proposes three privacy goals as well.99 Identification
of privacy goals, as described in Part II, was not clear cut, and
drafters were not convinced that the comparable, widely known
FIPPs could suffice as core objectives or be understood as goals
by a privacy engineer.100 The communication gap that NIST
described as a challenge continues, as the three privacy
objectives of predictability, manageability, and disassociability,
are not generally well known. Part III discusses what these
terms mean and how they relate to the FIPPS; Part IV then
delves more deeply into the very important meaning of
predictability.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 62, at 1.
PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 16.
Id. at 12.
Id.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
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A. PREDICTABILITY
The first privacy engineering objective in the Privacy
Framework—and the focus of Part IV—is predictability. It is
defined as the “enabling of reliable assumptions by individuals,
owners, and operators about PII and its processing by an
information system.”101 According to the framework, a “reliable
sense of what is occurring with PII in a system is core to
building trust and accountability, and is a primary part of the
underlying rationale for the transparency and accountability
FIPPs.”102 It is important because “[b]y framing predictability
in terms of reliable assumptions, agencies can begin to measure
more concretely the capabilities in a system that supports these
principles.”103 The framework provides an example of how what
has generally been regarded as a privacy principle can become
a measurable event.104 In most circumstances, if notice is
provided to a user, the only event observed or recorded is
whether the user was provided with notice.105 In contrast, it is
suggested that an assessment could be made as to whether the
user “read and understood the notice, or even whether they
responded as anticipated.”106

101. PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 17.
102. Id. at 18. Professors Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog argue that
trust is an “essential ingredient for our digital lives.” Neil Richards &
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 431, 433 (2016). “Without trust, people share less information, bad
information, or no information at all. They become anxious, bewildered, and
suspicious . . . . If people don’t trust a company, they are more likely to switch
to a competitor or resist or fail to become fully invested in the commercial
relationship.” Id. at 435. They argue that “modern privacy law is incomplete
because from its inception it has failed to account for the importance of trust.”
Id. “One of the bedrock notions of privacy law is that companies should be
transparent about their data collection, use, and disclosure practices so that
individuals will be on notice of any potentially worrisome practices and can
tailor their disclosures accordingly.” Id. at 462. “Trust need not be exclusively
a matter of government policy. Companies can also voluntarily adopt trustenhancing internal policies, safeguards, and organizational schemes . . . .
Companies can delete data when it is no longer needed and collect no more
information than is necessary for the information relationship.” Id. at 465.
These views are obviously quite consistent with the NIST objective of
predictability.
103. PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 18 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Predictability is also “about designing systems so that
stakeholders are not surprised by the handling of PII.”107 In this
regard, predictability “can support a range of organizational
interpretations of transparency—from a value statement about
the importance of open processes to a requirements-based
program that provides for the publication of how PII is
managed.”108 Basic assessment tools, like user surveys, can be
used to evaluate whether expectations are consistent with
actual practice. Such surveys can also be used to assess
whether a system’s actual disclosure of information, for
example, is in line with assumptions that users have regarding
what information about them will be disclosed.
Predictability also supports purpose specification and use
limitation.109 If there is a focus on “maintaining reliable
assumptions about processing of PII, predictability could
encourage system operators to assess and address the impact of
any changes in that processing.”110 If operators are diligent in
keeping the users interested and involved in the discussion of
their
expectations,
predictability
can
facilitate
the
“maintenance of stable, trusted relationships between systems
and individuals . . . .”111
B. MANAGEABILITY
The second privacy engineering objective in the Privacy
Framework is manageability, which is defined as “providing
the capability for granular administration of personal
information including alteration, deletion, and selective
disclosure.”112 “Manageability is an important system property
enabling several of the FIPPs: access and amendment;
accountability; minimization; quality and integrity; and
individual participation.”113 Systems must be able to
administer information at a sufficiently granular level to be
able to identify and correct inaccurate information, to dispose
of obsolete information, to collect or disclose only necessary

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
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information, and to assure that user’s privacy preferences are
accurately implemented and maintained.114
The framework emphasizes that manageability is not a
policy statement about whether users should have the right to
control their information, but rather a systems requirement
that information can be controlled at a level sufficient to
perform a variety of required operations on the data. Authority
to make those changes is a separate issue.115
C. DISASSOCIABILITY
The third privacy engineering objective introduced in the
Privacy Framework is disassociability, defined as “enabling the
processing of PII or events without association to individuals or
devices beyond the operational requirements of the system.”116
This objective maps primarily across the FIPPs objective of
minimization, but also of authority.117 Disassociability is
directed at making sure a system “actively protects or ‘blinds’
an individual’s identity or associated activities from
exposure.”118 It “advances the capabilities of a privacypreserving system by engaging system designers and engineers
in a deliberate consideration of points of exposure that are not
essential for the operation of the system.”119
“[A]chieving this objective should reflect the ability of the
system to complete [a] transaction without associating
information with individuals.”120 For example, while the
completion of a health care-related transaction may require
associating information with an individual, the association of
that information “should not be deemed an operational
requirement just because it would be difficult to disassociate
the information” from that individual.121 Agencies must assess
the risk involved with associating information with an
individual and understand that the recognition of such risk is a
separate issue than being able to make that association as an

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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operational requirement.122 In other words, the agency may
choose to accept the risk because it is too difficult or costly to
implement stronger, more privacy-preserving controls.123 It is
in this arena that technological advances in cryptography,
anonymity, de-identification and others may prove to be
extremely useful in mitigating privacy risks.124
In summary, the Privacy Framework maps the FIPPs
principles of accountability, authority, purpose specification
and use limitation, and transparency across the predictability
objective; access and amendment, accountability, minimization,
quality and integrity, and individual participation across the
manageability objective; and accountability and minimization
across the disassociability objective. Manageability and
disassociability can be accomplished by different technical
means by system operators, and stakeholders can debate
whether the means are strong or effective enough. These
aspects are largely measurable. However, the predictability
objective, with its decisions pertaining to data purpose and
broader use, is arguably the most important of these
interrelated privacy objectives. The definition of predictability
is less clear and less satisfying.125 The definition of
predictability presumes that processing of data will evolve and
change, that system operators can identify what assumptions
stakeholders make about how the data will be used in the
future, and can determine and avoid surprising citizens.
Maintaining trust is much about preserving predictability,126
and thus it is essential to analyze this cog that holds the
privacy framework together.
IV. THE MEANING AND APPLICATION OF
PREDICTABILITY
Predictability is a cornerstone of any rule of law,127 but
particularly in a common law system. The common law is
effective when it provides predictability. Individuals and
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 17.
126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (“[U]ncertainty has been regarded as
incompatible with the Rule of Law.”).
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business can make plans because they have confidence in the
predictability of legal outcomes. Much of the rationale for the
doctrine of stare decisis is related to the importance of the
stability and predictability of the law.128 In that regard, it is
certainly no surprise that one of NIST’s privacy engineering
objectives is predictability. In order for there to be confidence in
a system, its users and those whom it affects should be able to
build expectations upon predictability.
NIST is not a policy-setting agency; one of its goals is to
promote standardization in technical systems.129 Because
privacy is not a technical system however, any technical
standard will necessarily have legal and social implications.
The Privacy Framework system goal of predictability needs to
be considered from these viewpoints, to analyze whether it is
the appropriate systems goal for protecting privacy. The NIST
framework does not develop the definition of predictability, yet
it is identified as one of the “north stars” for systems design
and maintenance to protect privacy. There are no third-party
standards for predictability for reference. Ultimately what this
section grapples with is: “What does it mean for a system to be
predictable so that privacy is protected?”
The following sections analyze the meaning of
predictability by using comparisons from the law that are most
connected to the concept of predictability as conceived by NIST:
(1) preventing surprise; and (2) avoiding creepiness.130 The
analogies we believe are closest to these concepts are patent
law’s
nonobviousness
requirement
and
the
Fourth
Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy. To be clear, we
are not arguing that there is a direct relationship between
these legal concepts and the application of the Privacy
Framework to agencies’ data actions, but that the comparisons
are fruitful and can suggest actions for applying the objective
in order to most effectively protect privacy in federal
information systems.

128. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A
Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2012) (“Everyone thinks that
considerations of [predictability] are of great importance in justifying stare
decisis.”).
129. About
NIST,
NAT’L
INST.
STANDARDS
&
TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/about-nist (last updated June 14, 2017).
130. See Discussion Draft, supra note 56, at 2.
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A. PATENT LAW AND NONOBVIOUSNESS
The term “predictability” is found fairly prominently in the
legal literature as it applies to determining patent obviousness.
There may initially seem to be little relevance between patent
law and defining privacy goals for data systems, but
interestingly there is a useful parallel, a construct that may
help analyze the protection of privacy in a world of swiftly
evolving technology.
Patent law requires inventions to be non-obvious in order
to obtain intellectual property protection.131 The same
requirement applies to improvements; when an inventor
improves upon an existing, patent-protected technology or
product, the improvement itself must be non-obvious in order
to obtain a patent.132 The legal determination of whether the
improvement is obvious, and therefore not patentable, invokes
the question of whether the improvement upon, or a different
use of, an existing invention is predictable.133 Obviousness is a
legal question, but it is based on a factual determination.134
The 1966 Supreme Court decision in Graham v. John Deere135
adopted three factual questions relevant to determining

131. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) provides that:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that
the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that
the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by
the manner in which the invention was made.
We do not extend the analogy too far between patent obviousness and privacy
engineering because of differing policies underlying the analysis. In patent
law predictability is to be avoided because “[g]ranting patent protection to
advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation
retards progress and may, in the case of patents combining previously known
elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.” KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). In privacy engineering,
predictability is desired in order to support the reliable assumptions, or
reasonable expectations, of privacy. General analogy can be helpful to examine
the meaning of predictability, but at a more fine-grained level the analogy
breaks down due to opposite policy preferences for or against predictability.
132. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141 (9th ed., Jan. 2018) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at
417) [hereinafter MPEP].
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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obviousness for an improvement: (1) the state of the prior art;
(2) the difference between the prior art and the invention; and
(3) the ordinary skill of a practitioner in the relevant field.136
The USPTO explains;
In short, the focus when making a determination of obviousness
should be on what a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
would have known at the time of the invention, and on what such a
person would have reasonably expected to have been able to do in
view of that knowledge. This is so regardless of whether the source of
that knowledge and ability was documentary prior art, general
knowledge in the art, or common sense.137

Analogizing patent nonobviousness and predictability
inquiries to privacy and predictability for systems engineering,
the patent applicant wants the gap to be large and
unpredictable so that they may obtain a patent, whereas the
systems engineer does not want the gap to surprise
stakeholders. Stated another way, predictability is bad for the
patent applicant but good for the privacy engineer. The
conditions for and analysis of what makes a patent
improvement obvious or an information system data processing
surprising, are mutually informative, as the information
system being assessed is analogous to the improvement upon
the existing patent. Applying the Graham gap test to the
predictability of systems, an engineer first needs to understand
the prior art of privacy.
1. Prior Art and Privacy
The state of the art of privacy is analogous to the prior art
related to existing patents and common knowledge in the field.
As data collection and processing increases, from digital
footprints,138 to increasing sensorization of the environment,139

136. MPEP supra note 132. The USPTO examiner will evaluate the gap
based on these facts and will consider additional factors such as “commercial
success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, and unexpected
results,” to make a determination.
137. Id.
138. See Mary Madden et al., Digital Footprints, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 16,
2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/2007/12/16/digital-footprints/.
139. See Peter Clarke, Yole Predicts the ‘Sensorization’ of Modern Life, EE
TIMES
(June
12,
2015),
https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1326858.
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to systems of data systems, and predictive analytic systems,140
this first step makes it essential to have a longitudinal
understanding of the privacy environment and how the system
processes information in variance from current law and norms.
This will be a difficult task, as there is no database similar to
the USPTO database that can be searched to determine if there
is a history of any similar collection or use of the information in
a system, although the USPTO search for prior art is broader
than such a theoretical database. The first step would be,
however, to interrogate past agency or entity processing of data
in a similar manner to begin to understand the prior art, and
the stakeholders’ reliable assumptions. The discrepancy,
however, is that unlike the grant of a patent, past system
practices have not been vetted, and the internal investigation
of prior systems and their effect will not include external
systems that would affect a stakeholder’s reliable assumption
of how the data will be processed more generally.
Patent examiners are instructed to consider the prior art
in both the field in which the invention is situated and the
“prior art that is in a field of endeavor other than that of the
[patent] applicant . . . or solves a problem which is different
from that which the applicant was trying to solve.”141 As
difficult as a patent examination is to execute, the privacy
engineer’s job will be much more complex and difficult. An
additional part of the analogy is that just as the patent
examination must consider different fields of practice, the
privacy engineer should consider different contexts when
viewing the prior art. This is the stage at which NIST’s
reference to the necessity of interactions between the privacy
engineer and the privacy officer, and inclusion of laws,
regulations, and norms, is essential to establish privacy prior
art.
2. Ordinary Skill and Stakeholders
Whether an invention is obvious—or predictable—is
measured through the eyes of one who has ordinary skill in the

140. See Dennis Hirsh, Introduction to Predictive Analytics Law and
Policy: A New Filed Emerges, 14 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO SOC’Y 1, 1–3
(2017).
141. MPEP, supra note 132.
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area.142 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (“KSR”),143 the
Supreme Court stated that:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives
and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the
same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can
implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.
For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that
it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the
technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her
skill.144

In this context, the definition of who has ordinary skill in
assumptions about processing of PII matters greatly, as this
defines the eyes through which privacy implications of the
system will be viewed; the stakeholder is analogous to the
person of ordinary skill in patent law. The USPTO
Examination Guidelines explain that,
The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is
presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention.
Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary
skill in the art may include: (1) “type of problems encountered in the
art;” (2) “prior art solutions to those problems;” (3) “rapidity with
which innovations are made;” (4) “sophistication of the technology;
and” (5) “educational level of active workers in the field.”145

The factors relevant to ordinary skill in patent law may
also be helpful for analyzing the nature of a reliable
assumption; the hypothetical person should understand: the
sophistication of the individuals whose PII is being used can
change the assumptions of what a system will do, rapidly
changing use of PII may make it difficult to make accurate
assumptions, and unusual uses of PII or quickly changing uses
of PII due to technical advances. Again, the privacy officer
could be the best situated to reflect upon both sides of the
equation.
3. The Gap Between Old and New
In sum, the patent applicant must show that “the
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art
elements according to their established functions.”146 Assessing
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
MPEP supra note 132.
KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
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the gap between the prior art and the invention through the
view of the skilled person in the area is the final step to
determine predictability and nonobviousness. A gap analysis
was firmly established as precedent, the core component to
decide whether an invention was predictable. In 2007, the
Supreme Court in KSR added nuance to the determination by
rejecting a formulistic approach to determining obviousness.147
The Court held that in addition to considering the gap between
the inventions and the state of prior art, that “[t]he
combination of familiar elements according to known methods
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
predictable results.”148 In cases of inventions that combine the
functions of two previously known technologies to create a
third, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have
prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to
combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention
does.”149 In other words, “a court must ask whether the
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art
elements according to their established functions.”150 In
addition, secondary considerations should be included in the
analysis and subsequent guidance from the USPTO lists these
factors:
(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to
yield predictable results;
(B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain
predictable results;
(C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or
products) in the same way;
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or
product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results;
(E) “Obvious to try” – choosing from a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success.151

147. It is beyond the scope of this article, but the KSR decision has been
subject to criticism and the claim that it moves the test for obviousness on a
scale previously tending towards objectivity instead towards subjectivity. See
Gene Quinn, KSR the 5th Anniversary: One Supremely Obvious Mess, IP
WATCHDOG (Apr. 29, 2012), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/29/ksr-the5th-anniversary-one-supremely-obvious-mess/id=24456/.
148. KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
149. Id. at 418.
150. Id. at 417.
151. MPEP, supra note 132. F and G are not included in the list as they are
incorporated into the general analysis discussed above. “(F) Known work in
one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for use in either the same
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These elements might be mapped to the flexible uses of PII
in information systems and predictability as described by the
NIST goal. The question becomes whether the use of PII in a
secondary way could arguably be analyzed with regard to a
predictable outcome similar to the guidelines for patent
predictability. Such mapping could produce the following
allowable actions:
(A) PII that has been used predictably in two different
ways can be combined if there are predictable results;
(B) Simple substitution of one use for PII for another use
for PII to obtain predictable results;
(C) Use of PII in a known way is predictable if used in
another system (methods, or products) in the same way;
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device
(method, or product) ready for improvement to yield predictable
results;
(E) If it is “Obvious to combine” PII – choosing from a finite
number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable
expectation of success.
Professor Christopher Cotropia points out two variations in
the predictability analysis within KSR’s definition152 and
names these Type I and Type II predictability. Type I
predictability is the analysis established before KSR, focusing
on the gap between an existing patented technology and the
improvement on that technology being reviewed for
nonobviousness and patentability.153 Cotropia summarizes
Type 1 predictability analysis as “whether bridging this gap
would have been obvious to one skilled in the art or not.”154
Type II predictability, on the other hand, does not focus on the
difference between the inventions but rather focuses on the
“predictability as to results,”155 which seems to closely map to

field or a different one based on design incentives or other market forces if the
variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art; (G) Some
teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led one of
ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art
reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.” Id.
152. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and
Nonobviousness in Patent Law After KSR, 20 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L.
REV. 391 (2014).
153. Id. at 397.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 405.
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the NIST goal for privacy engineering. Cotropia criticizes Type
II predictability because of its “inability to provide insight to
the size of the gap.”156 In sum, Type I predictability asks
whether the invention’s creation was predictable, whereas Type
II asks whether the “invention produces predictable results.”157
This is a significant difference, as it “shifts the substantive
questions . . . [to focus on] the invention and how it
operates.”158
There is a striking comparison between the patent analysis
of predictability and the use of PII in information systems
under FIPPs and the NIST concept of predictability. Similar to
Type I analysis, FIPPs data use requirements revolve around a
determination of whether the data are being used for purposes
that are the same as disclosed, agreed upon, and purposed for;
a small or nonexistent gap would result in predictability.159 The
use of the patent examination framework of considering prior
art and the ordinarily skilled person could be helpful in this
analysis. The NIST approach, however, arguably uses a Type II
form of predictability that focuses on the resulting functions of
the system and whether the use of PII results in surprise.160
A fundamental criticism of Type II predictability is that it
results in hindsight bias, or what is commonly known as
“Monday Morning Quarterbacking.”161 People tend to analyze
past events differently once they know the results. It is much
easier to believe an “event is more predictable after it becomes
known than it was before it became known”162 The result is
that “because the perspective of the skilled artisan is changed
from being prospective to being retrospective,” this “increases
the likelihood of errors”163 in determining predictability. In a
particularly relevant comment for privacy, Cotropia describes
the impact as the “risks of journeying down a development path

156. Id. at 407.
157. Id. at 412.
158. Id. at 424.
159. See supra Part I.A.
160. See supra Part II.
161. See, e.g., Therese A. Louie, Mahesh N. Rajan & Robert E. Sibley,
Tackling the Monday Morning Quarterbacking: Applications of Hindsight Bias
in Decision-Making Settings, 25 SOC. COGNITION 32 (2007)
162. Neal J. Roese & Kathleen D. Vohs, Hindsight Bias, 7 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 411, 411 (2012).
163. Cotropia, supra note 152, at 424.
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that an ordinary skilled artisan would not have taken.”164 The
NIST approach to privacy engineering risks the same hindsight
bias by using a Type II predictability analysis that looks back
at the way that the system supports reliable assumptions about
how PII will be used in that same system. Without at least
including a joint Type I analysis that looks at the gap between
different uses of the information (prior art) under the standard
of the ordinarily skilled artisan, the flexibility that NIST
incorporates in its vision may be a self-fulfilling and hollow
exercise.
Furthermore, the standard of the ordinarily skilled artisan
is deeply connected with the legally prominent concept of the
reasonable person, based on the on the benchmark of the
ordinarily prudent person. Privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment have for a long time been viewed through the lens
of reasonable expectations, which also incorporates this
approach.165 The next section explores these concepts as related
to predictability and what it means to have reasonable
assumptions about the use of data in an information system.
B. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AND PREDICTABILITY
The NIST privacy objectives are applied to data that are in
an agency’s system of records. They are not meant to be applied
to decide whether an agency can collect that data without a
warrant and whether the data collection might violate the
Fourth Amendment.166 It should be noted that to that extent,
the concept of reasonable expectations, which is part of any
discussion about the meaning of privacy in the Fourth
Amendment context, is not applicable. But, the definition of
predictability, using the term reliable assumptions, is
perilously similar to the reasonable expectation term of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. As the previous discussion of
patent nonobviousness and predictability revealed, reasonable

164. Id.
165. See infra Part IV.B.1.
166. See Harold Laidlaw, Shouting Down the Well: Human Observation As
a Necessary Condition of Privacy Breach, and Why Warrants Should Attach to
Data Access, Not Data Gathering, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 323, 353 (2015)
(“The administrative information exception is intended to be uncontroversial.
Essentially it serves the interest of avoiding formalistic restrictions on the
access of data that may be passively gathered but which has historically been
considered categorically available to state actors.”).
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expectations are part of the analysis. For this comparative
reason, the next section discusses the history of reasonable
expectations, and its challenges for relevance in an era of
technological change. How to reliably predict potentially
changing assumptions is where the comparison to the
reasonable expectation of privacy can be instructive. “[T]he
reasonable person’s task in the law . . . is the sound resolution
of whatever rational conflict the law may throw at him.”167 This
also serves the purpose of keeping the determination as a
question of fact, rather than a question of law.168 “[T]he
generalisations made in the name of the reasonable person are
not legal generalisations. They do not enter the law. They are
used by the law to avoid the need for a legal generalisation to
be made.”169 This becomes relevant to the notion of
predictability as an objective concept that is quantifiable and
factual.
1. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Ever since its creation more than fifty years ago in Katz v.
United States,170 the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test
has served as the barometer for privacy protection under the
Fourth Amendment. However, due in large part to evolving
surveillance techniques and ubiquitous digital collection of
information, this standard may fail. As Professor Daniel Solove
stated, “the reasonable expectation of privacy test cannot be
resuscitated . . . [and it] is not merely in need of repair—it is
doomed.”171 The question is whether the notion of predictability
suffers from the same inherent weaknesses, or whether lessons
from reasonable expectation jurisprudence can provide a map
for avoiding the pitfalls.
In Katz v. United States, in order to collect evidence about
illegal gambling, the FBI surreptitiously recorded a telephone
conversation by attaching a tape recorder on the outside and

167. John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 L.Q.
REV. 563, 565 (2015).
168. See id. at 569 (clarifying that the reasonable person standard is often
explained as “a question of fact, not a question of law”).
169. Id.
170. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
171. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV.
1511, 1521 (2010).
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top of two public telephone booths.172 The defendant made the
call from inside one of the two booths after walking in and
closing the door behind him.173 The Supreme Court held that
this was an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment
because the FBI had violated Katz’ privacy.174 The legacy of the
Katz case came not from the majority opinion, but rather from
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion,175 which was subsequently
adopted by the majority of the Court a year later in Terry v.
Ohio.176 The operative language from Harlan’s concurrence is:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’ Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where
he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances
would be unreasonable.177

It is regrettable that over the last fifty years so much
emphasis has been placed on trying to make sense of the
differences between the supposed two prongs of the Katz test,
when, arguably, none was intended by the Court.178 In 2015,
Professor Orin Kerr wrote Katz Has Only One Step: The

172. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
173. Id. at 352.
174. Id. at 353.
175. Id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. See 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
177. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
178. In two excellent companion articles, Peter Winn and Harvey
Schneider discuss the history of the Katz case in great detail. Peter Winn,
Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009); Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The
Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 13 (2009). Schneider was the then
twenty-nine-year-old lawyer who argued for Katz before the Supreme Court.
Schneider described in detail how he argued to the Court that what he was
proposing was an objective test – not a subjective one. He wrote: “We propose
a test using a way that’s not too dissimilar from the tort ‘reasonable man’
test . . . we would ask that the test be applied as to whether or not a third
person objectively looking at the entire scene could reasonably interpret, and
could reasonably say, that the communicator intended his communication to
be confidential.” Id. at 20.
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Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations,179 arguing two
significant points. First, the results of an empirical study based
upon 540 cases that employed the Katz test showed that, in the
vast majority of cases, courts applied only the objective test,
and not the subjective test.180
Secondly, Kerr makes a convincing argument that Harlan
likely never intended that there be a separate, truly subjective
inquiry, even though subsequent cases and articles have
awkwardly attempted or pretended to do so ever since. Kerr
focuses on Harlan’s statement that the test was “an
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
decisions”181 and that Harlan “did not intend to create a new
test from whole cloth.”182 In order to be consistent with
Harlan’s assertion that he was not creating a new test, one can
read the second sentence as referring to the then-existing line
of cases involving a “voluntary exposure of protected spaces”
and the third sentence as referring to the then-existing
“protected-area cases.”183 This would explain why Harlan
referred to this line of cases as “subjective” in nature, and
would be consistent with his assertion that the “rule has
emerged from prior decisions.”184
Although it may not have been within the contemplation of
the NIST drafters, to meet the predictability objective a system
operator will necessarily need to choose how to assess
individual assumptions about the use of information; this
invokes a similar decision and struggle about whether to use a
subjective or objective standard, or both. The determination
will be affected, one way or another, by changes in technology
and by an evolution in assumptions about how systems of data
will be used and ultimately how they will impact personal life.
Reliable assumptions will be difficult to assess because they
can change with the times, circumstances, and social values, so
179. Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113 (2015).
180. “The results of the study suggest that the subjective prong of Katz is
irrelevant. A majority of cases applying Katz did not mention subjective
expectations. Only 12 percent of Katz cases purported to apply the subjective
test. Only 2 percent of Katz cases claimed to hinge their analysis on the
subjective test.” Id. at 122.
181. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan concurring).
182. Kerr, supra note 179, at 124.
183. Kerr, supra note 179, at 126.
184. Id.
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comparing them to the history and jurisprudence of the
reasonable man standard seems a perfect analogy for the fastmoving subject of data analytics. The analogy provides a
warning, as Professor Daniel Solove states that, “the
reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency,”185 and that
application of this approach to privacy has “failed to live up to
aspirations.”186 In the years following Katz, the Supreme Court
“adopted a conception of privacy that countless commentators
have found to be overly narrow, incoherent, short-sighted,
deleterious to liberty, and totally out of touch with society.”187
“As Justice Scalia once stated, ‘In my view, the only thing the
past three decades have established about the Katz test . . . is
that, unsurprisingly, [reasonable expectations of privacy] bear
an uncanny resemblance to those expectation of privacy that
this Court considers reasonable.’”188
A brief review of cases following Katz shows how the
application of the reasonable expectation standard has
significantly hampered the law pertaining to privacy
protection. In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held
that an individual does not have an expectation of privacy in
financial records once he or she has shared them with a
bank.189 In Smith v. Maryland, the Court similarly held that
there was no expectation of privacy in the list of phone
numbers one has dialed once that list has been shared with the
phone company.190 This so-called “third party doctrine” has
proven to be a major impediment in protecting informational
privacy as it is rare that information today is not shared
somehow or someway with someone.191 These and following
decisions192 have been criticized as being ill-suited for today’s
185. Solove, supra note 171, at 1511.
186. Id. at 1519.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1521 (quoting from Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, at 97
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
189. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, at 442 (1976).
190. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
191. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087,
1151–52 (2002).
192. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Supreme Court
found a defendant to have no reasonable expectation of privacy in his fenced
backyard from a private plane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet because
defendant’s “expectation that his yard was protected from such surveillance
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data-driven world and as over-emphasizing the secrecy aspect
of privacy: “Life in the modern Information Age often involves
exchanging information with third parties, such as phone
companies, Internet service providers, cable companies,
merchants, and so on. Thus, clinging to the notion of privacy as
total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of privacy in
today’s world.”193 Solove asks: “Would the Supreme Court
really hold that people lack an expectation of privacy in their
medical information because they convey that information to
their physicians? This result would strike many as absurd.”194
It is fair to question whether the reasonable expectation
standard has deviated too far from the reasonable person
standard, becoming unrealistic and ineffective, by setting
bright line distinctions such as the third party test.195 The
reliable assumptions objective could avoid this problem by
avoiding a rules oriented approach and remaining true to a
standard, such as the reasonable person standard, that
considers the circumstances and context.
was unreasonable, because ‘[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace
who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed.’”
Id. 213–14. In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), the Supreme
Court held that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the garbage he left at his curb for pickup by the sanitation department. The
Court stated that the warrantless search and seizure of the garbage would
violate the Fourth Amendment only if the defendant “manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in [his] garbage that society accepts as objectively
reasonable . . . [and] that an expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth
Amendment protection . . . unless society is prepared to accept that
expectation as objectively reasonable.” Id. 39–40.
193. See Solove, supra note 191, at 1152. In U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2012), the Supreme Court decided that a 4-week attachment of a GPS device
to the underbelly of a car violated the Fourth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor,
in a concurring opinion, questioned whether the third-party doctrine is still
appropriate: “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). She stated that this
“approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.” Id.
194. Solove, supra note 171, at 1532.
195. The Supreme Court recently refused to extend the third party doctrine
to the cell-site location information that is routinely generated and used by
mobile telephones, in Carpenter v. U. S., 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). There were
five separate opinions in the case with multiple criticisms of the Katz test and
multiple calls for positive legislation regarding data privacy. See generally
Jordan M. Blanke, Carpenter v. United States Begs for Action, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. ONLINE 260.
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In Florida v. Riley,196 the Supreme Court again foreclosed
a variety of potential privacy arguments by making, in
retrospect, a very broad holding. While it recognized that the
defendant clearly had a subjective expectation of privacy in his
backyard greenhouse, it held that there was no objective
expectation of privacy.197 The plurality held that the defendant
“could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was
protected from public or official observation”198 as long as the
plane was flying in navigable airspace, as “[a]ny member of the
public could legally have been flying over [his] property in a
helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed
[his] greenhouse.”199 Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring
opinion that the defendant’s “expectation of privacy was
unreasonable not because the airplane was operating where it
had a ‘right to be,’ but because public air travel at 1,000 feet is
a sufficiently routine part of modern life that it is unreasonable
for persons on the ground to expect that their curtilage will not
be observed from that altitude.”200 This is an extremely broad
statement. The three-justice dissent criticized the plurality’s
decision and Justice O’Connor’s observation because under that
interpretation, one’s “expectation of privacy is defeated if a
single member of the public could conceivably position herself
to see into the area in question without doing anything
illegal.”201
Another line of Supreme Court cases that was decided
solely on the basis of the objective standard of the Katz test,
also resulted in diminishing expectations of privacy. In
O’Connor v. Ortega,202 the Court addressed whether a public
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk
drawers and personal file cabinets in his office.203 The Court
stated that the “operational realities of the workplace . . . may
make some employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable

196. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
197. Id. at 450. The Greenwood and Riley holdings are also criticized by
Solove as further examples of too narrowly interpreting privacy as secrecy.
Solove, supra note 171 at 1520–21.
198. See Florida v. Riley, supra note 196, at 450.
199. Id. at 451.
200. Id. at 452, 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 456, 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
202. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
203. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 711–12 (1987).
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when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law
enforcement official.”204 The Court stated that the expectations
of both public and private employees in “their offices, desks,
and file cabinets . . . may be reduced by virtue of actual office
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”205 This
holding, along with those in similar cases, has pretty much
solidified the objective societal value (applying the second
prong of the Katz test) that there is virtually no expectation of
privacy in the workplace.
The reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence
identifies several pitfalls that plague the application of an
objective standard. Any agency or company that seeks to apply
predictability under the Privacy Framework as a concrete
objective can learn from and attempt to avoid these pitfalls.
Although predictability is described as a measurable goal, the
expectation of privacy cases teach that while applying an
objective standard is not simple, efforts to draw strict
boundaries can create illogical results. The first issue is that of
the dynamic nature of systems change; both technology
developments and the adaptation of assumptions are part of
that environment. An analysis of how the application of a
reasonable expectation standard was not able to keep up with
the technology holds lessons for the application of reliable
assumptions.
2. Reliable Assumptions and Pitfalls
NIST applies the objective of predictability, defined as
reliable assumptions, to the context of all stakeholders:
citizens, users, and system administrators alike.206 This
discussion is limited to how the goal of predictability can be
understood from the perspective of citizens’ reliable
assumptions.207 In a prescient 2002 article, Shaun Spencer
described the inevitable erosion inherent in the expectation204. Id. at 717.
205. Id.. at 717. See infra notes 177-184 and accompanying text.
206. See Discussion Draft, supra note 56, 18–19. The Draft does not clearly
define a stakeholder. The text discusses agencies and system owners and
operators, but the footnotes refer to studies of enabling consumer trust by
protecting consumer privacy. We assume that consumers—citizens—are
stakeholders, and that their reliable assumptions, and preventing surprise,
are key to the privacy framework. The text also refers to assumptions of
individuals about how their information will be used. P. 19
207. Id.
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driven conception of privacy.208 He accurately predicted how, in
an increasingly information-rich environment, there would be
incremental encroachments on privacy that would consistently
drive down expectations.209 For example, employees’
expectations of privacy slowly shrank each time employers so
declared limitations – first in telephone conversations, then in
e-mail communications, then in anything stored on one’s
computer – to the point where there is virtually no expectation
of privacy in the workplace today.210 Similarly, the third party
doctrine diminished the expectation of privacy in any kind of
information delivered to another person.211 Spencer described
how individuals tend to internalize these successive
encroachments and how, over time, the expectation keeps
getting smaller and smaller.212 The cases discussed in the
previous section illustrate Spencer’s point that, without a
significant change in jurisprudence,213 the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard is on a downward spiral. The
objective of reliable assumptions will suffer from the same
spiral, and affect the fundamental nature of privacy
assumptions, unless those applying the Privacy Framework
avoid this pitfall.

208. See generally Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the
Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L.R. 843 (2002).
209. Id. at 857–58. In the absence of statutory protection for privacy, the
standards rely almost exclusively on social norms. When there is legislation,
often spurred by some event or some case, that legislation often serves to
create or boost society’s expectation of privacy. For example, in the aftermath
of the disclosure that a reporter in Washington, D.C. was able to obtain a copy
of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s video rental history, a concerned
group of Congressmen very quickly passed legislation to protect those – and
their – records. The effect was to elevate the societal expectation of privacy in
such records. Similarly, in the aftermath of the unpopular Olmstead decision
(Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)), Congress amended the law
to protect interception of telephone communications, thus creating a new
expectation of privacy in such communications.
210. Id. at 860–62.
211. Id. at 860.
212. Id. at 863–66.
213. At the time this paper is written, Carpenter v. U.S. is pending a
decision before the United States Supreme Court, a case in which discussions
of differing views on the nature of expectations of privacy predominated. See
Jeffrey Rosen, A Liberal-Conservative Alliance on the Supreme Court Against
Digital
Surveillance,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
30,
2017)
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/bipartisanship-supremecourt/547124/.
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The second pitfall to be avoided in applying the
predictability objective is that it will be difficult to measure
reliable assumptions. When Solove describes the inexorable
erosion of privacy expectations due to technology he identifies
the role that courts play in “bootstrapping” the movement of
expectations, and warns that “the government could condition
the populace into expecting less privacy.”214 The application of
a predictability standard to systems of information will suffer
from the same weaknesses unless lessons can be learned from a
comparison.
There is a striking similarity between the dilemma of
technology and reasonable expectation jurisprudence and data
use and reliable assumptions under the goal of predictability.
The court that applies the reasonable expectation of privacy to
decide if the use of surveillance violates privacy rights, is
analogous to the system operator and the determination of
risks to privacy and whether the system use of data is
predictable. In order to avoid a similar erosion of privacy, how
the risk management approach to privacy215 is implemented is
key. There are at least three lessons about reliable
assumptions to be learned from this analysis.
First, determination of assumptions is a multi-stakeholder
process, but citizen vulnerabilities and potential data harms
are the most difficult to assess and the most important for
maintaining trust. Applying an objective view of predictability,
including the circumstances and the context of the information
system, but applying it in a systematic way, is important to
establish reliability. Second, privacy engineering will be a
catalyst for lowering the bar for assumptions of privacy, a
bootstrapping exercise, unless care is taken to create a systems
approach that lies outside of internal technical biases and third
party pressures for access. Third, although data is collected in
ever increasing amounts and in more fine-grained ways,
similar to the march of surveillance technology, this fact alone
should not be used as a basis for designing a system that
incorporates the excesses. Numbness should not be equated
with predictability.
214. Solove, supra note 171, 1523–24.
215. A discussion of the implementation of a privacy risk management
assessment is beyond the scope of this article, however, under the risk
analysis, the definition of vulnerabilities and problematic data actions will be
required.
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In sum, implementation of the NIST Privacy Framework,
in a sustainable and robust way, is likely not a desktop
exercise. Engagement with stakeholders, evidence gathering,
and protection from creeping liberalization of data sharing
should be well recognized weaknesses that are watched and
monitored. Otherwise, the trust that comes from reliable
assumptions about the predictable way that information
systems will be used will turn into cynicism about ways in
which citizens are monitored or monetized in an administrative
state or industry.
CONCLUSION
Professor Julie Cohen correctly predicted that traditional
values regarding “property,”216 “choice,”217 “knowledge,”218 and
“speech”219 would make it very difficult to accommodate
informational privacy rights. She argued that there was a need
to incorporate protections that hold the data processing
industry accountable.220 NIST privacy engineering may not be
a perfect fit, but it is a step in that direction. Cohen argues that
“we must use both technology and law” to address privacy
threats.221 The Privacy Framework addresses Cohen’s
admonition that “privacy consideration has not been uppermost
in the [system] design process, but what is chosen can be
changed.”222 The underlying philosophy of NIST’s approach is
found in the privacy objectives, and the first objective,
predictability, is at the crux of its success in protecting privacy
in information systems. Lessons from comparisons to both the
history and jurisprudence of patent nonobviousness, and the
reasonable expectation of privacy, can increase the ultimate
effectiveness of the Privacy Framework.
In order for predictable systems to create trust and protect
privacy, administrators should become adept at monitoring the
gaps between old and new uses, and should avoid the hindsight
bias of the kind that can plague review of patents for
216. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377–91 (2000).
217. Id. at 1391–402.
218. Id. at 1402–08.
219. Id. at 1408–23.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1436.
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nonobviousness. The emphasis, instead, should be placed on
the prospective use of information, rather than on a
retrospective analysis. To maintain reliable assumptions about
how information will be used in a system, administrators
should learn from the reasonable expectation of privacy
jurisprudence that data use creep, like technology creep, can
severely diminish privacy protection by small steps, that the
Privacy Framework can contribute to the erosion of privacy by
bootstrapping, by promoting assumptions that are defined in
that very process; and lastly, that determining and
maintaining predictable systems requires external interaction
with stakeholders and longitudinal validation.
Predictability of a system to protect privacy is a laudable
goal, and one day may become as ingrained and successful as
the goals in the Cybersecurity Framework. Predictability may
help to support the Fair Information Privacy Practices by
assessing and implementing purpose and use parameters, but
much work is left to be done to define the concept so that it
avoids the pitfalls of similar thorny areas. This is an era of
increased pressure on government agencies to make the
information in their systems widely available. While there may
be benefits earned from increased data availability, there can
nonetheless be a systemic loss of trust if personal information
is later identified or used for different purposes. To avoid
predictability being a hollow objective, agencies and voluntary
adopters of the Privacy Framework should institute risk
management approaches that consider whether the gap
between old and potentially new uses is too wide, whether
there is hindsight bias in their assessments, and if the very
risk analysis that they perform is diminishing the assumptions
that there is some personal information that should remain
private. The Census Bureau is an example of an agency that
recognizes the threats to trust that can result from information
system leakage, and it could benefit from the insights into the
Privacy Framework under this analysis.

